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ABSTRACT 
Discrepancies in the age of emergence of transitivity 
have been found by various investigators. Piagetians argue 
that transitivity emerges at approximately age seven to 
eight years while other researchers claim that children as 
young as four to five years have transitivity skills. It 
can be argued that these differing conclusions about the 
age of emergence of transitivity are possibly due to dif-
ferences in methodological variables. The major objectives 
of the present investigation were to determine whether dif-
ferences in the age of emergence of transitivity are due to 
methodological differences in: 1) type of training (active 
training vs. passive training) b) order of presentation of 
training pairs during training (random vs. ordered), and/or 
c) type of response criterion demanded (judgment vs. explana-
tion). 
Subjects age 4-5 to 5-0, 6-0 to 6-7, and 7-6 to 8-0 were 
administered one of four premise pair training tasks: passive 
ordered pair, passive random block, active ordered pair, or 
active random block. Subsequent to the training phase sub-
jects were tested on inference pairs using one of two types 
of response criteria: judgment only or judgment plus explana-
tion. 
Significant age and type of training effects were found 
for both the judgment and explanation criteria on inference 
pair errors. No stgnif.icant order of trainlng pairs effect 
was found for either criterion. These results lend partial 
support to the major hypotheses. It ca..~ thus be concluded 
-
that methodological differences among studies on transitivity 
may often affect the age at which this skill emerges. Theoret-
ical and research implications are discussed. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Transitive inference is the type of reasoning in which 
items are related such that if the first is related to the 
second and the second is so related to a third then the first 
is so related to a third (Grove, 1967). More specifically 
transitive inference is the type of reasoning in which a 
valid conclusion of the form A)C can be derived from premises 
of the form A)B and B)C, where A, B, and C possess different 
values of some variable. One example of the transitive in-
ference task is the following ordered question: 
Jack is taller than Jeff. 
Jeff is taller than Mark. 
Who is taller, Jack or Mark? 
Variables with a simple metric (e.g. length, weight) lend 
themselves easily to transitive inferences; variables whose 
metric is complex or partly arbitrary {e.g. measures of skill, 
preference, or creativity; standings in a competition) often 
do not. 
It has long been believed by Jean Piaget and others that 
children are unable to form transitive inferences until they 
pass from the stage of preoperational thought to the stage 
of concrete operations at approximately age seven (Flavell, 
1963; Piaget, Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1960). The transitive 
inference task is one of the most frequently employed bar-
ometers of the development of concrete operations. Piaget 
and his colleagues propose that young children (below age 
seven) cannot combine separate experiences in order to pro-
duce a new inferential solution. In particular, given the 
2 
basic premises that A)B and B)C, the young child is dominated 
by immediate perceptual input and cannot reorganize this in-
put once new perceptual items arrive. Perceptual domination 
and the inability to understand the reversibility of ordered 
relations thus prevent the child from making inferences and 
lead to severe logical thinking constraints (Bryant, 1973). 
In his study of geometrical conceptions Piaget discusses 
transitivity within the context of spontaneous measurement 
(Piaget et al, 1960). The development of transitivity skills 
comes late in the growth of logical relations. Piaget believes 
that a child can recognize lengths of individual terms and 
the relations between two terms in one pair without being able 
to order or seriate the lengths of more than one pair of 
terms. The young child can judge the lengths of the indi-
vidual stimuli but cannot yet work with the relations be-
tween and among the pairs of stimuli of varying lengths. 
Transitivity enters a child's relational structuring when re-
versibility and passage among three terms can be understood. 
At this point in development a particular term in a series 
(Bin the given example) is no longer viewed as having a 
one-way relation (either smaller than or larger than) but 
is viewed instead as capable of having two relations simul-
taneously (both smaller than some things and larger than 
others). 
The traditional Piagetian task directly relevant to 
transitivity of length concerns the development of measur-
ing techniques which presuppose transitivity (Piaget et al, 
1960). Children are · asked to build a tower of blocks equal 
J 
in measured height to a tower already built by the exper-
imenter. The latter tower stands on a table which is higher 
than the table on which the child is to build his/her tower. 
Sticks of various lengths are made available but the child 
is not told how to use them. The criterion of mastery in 
this task is the child's ability to use sticks of varying 
lengths as intermediate comparative measures of the towers. 
The majority of children appear to understand and master 
the measuring technique only after age seven or eight years. 
The principle developmental stages are: 1) a crude compar-
ison without taking into account the difference in table 
heights, 2) attempts to bring the towers together for closer 
visual comparison and the child's use of his/her own body 
as a common measure, 3) use of body-independent measures such 
as a tower or stick which must be exactly the same length as 
the tower to be measured and 4) use of sticks longer and 
shorter than the model. Piaget argues that the child's suc-
cessful use of measurement implies the use of transitivity 
in the form: if A=B and B=C then A=C. 
The focus of the present study is to examine the dis-
crepancies between Piagetian and other researchers over the 
age of emergence of transitivity. The study specifically 
investigates the following methodological differences in the 
research on transitive inference: 1) age of subjects, 
2) type of training on premise pairs {e.g. A)B and B>C for 
A)C), 3) ordering of premise pairs during training, and 4) 
type of criterion used during testing for transitivity. 
4 
~ualitative vs, Quantitative Differences 
Piaget's assumptions and findings concerning the tran-
sitive inference task have been challenged by several inves-
tigators (Braine, 1959; Bryant, 1973, 1974; Bryant & Trabasso, 
1971; DeBoysson-Bardies & O'Regan, 1973; Harris & Bassett, 
1975; Lutkus & Trabasso, 1974; Riley, 1975, 1976; Riley & 
Trabasso, 1974; Roodin & Gruen, 1970; Trabasso, 1975; Trabasso, 
Riley & Wilson, 1975). These authors claim that Piaget's 
inference task does not, in fact, test whether the young 
child has inferential ability or not. Their basic hypothe-
sis is that children's differences in making transitive infer-
· ences may be more a matter of the memory processes involved 
than a lack of logical competence. In other words, one must 
ensure that the child has remembered the comparisons which 
have to be combined (A)B and B)C) if one is to conclude that 
the child is or is not actually making transitive inferences. 
If memory fails to be controlled an erroneous response may 
have little to do with inferential ability or level of logical 
thinking. 
Piaget typically did not control for memory factors and 
al ~hough he has been criticized for this omission by Bryant 
and Trabasso, Piagetians (Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969; Smedslund, 
1963) would argue that the effect of memory training is to 
produce only the semblance of a true operation. Piagetians 
would thus predict that the ability to utilize transitivity 
acquired through memory traini!lg wocld lack resistance to 
extinction and would fail to generalize to tasks other than 
those used in training. The memory training procedures 
5 
used for transitivity tasks have also been said to focus on 
the psychological processes by which knowledge embodied in 
the child's cognitive structures gets accessed and utilized 
in real situations, rather than on logical representations, 
groupings, rules, etc. which actually form these cognitive 
structures (Flavell & Wohwill, 1969). The basic controversy 
stems from different theoretical assumptions concerning the 
nature of cognitive development. Piaget and his colleagues 
conceive of cognitive development as proceeding in a discon-
tinuous fashion with identifiable qualitatively different 
stages emerging during various life periods. Each stage 
represents a unified set of cognitive structures; develop-
ment is not viewed as the continuous maturation of indepen-
dent psychological entities. Developmental stage transitions 
are consequently not defined in terms of purely quantitative 
changes (Flavell, 1963; 1977). The position taken by Trabasso 
is precisely the opposite: "Cognitive development may be 
seen as continuous and qualitatively similar to the target 
adult-model. The growth of a child's capacity for immediate, 
short-term and long-term memory is likely to be gradual and 
quantitative" (Trabasso, 1975, p. 136-137). In his concep-
tualization of cognitive growth 'l'rabasso makes a distinction 
between the skills possessed by the young child and the adult 
only on the basis of accumulation of information and the 
development of more efficient and adaptive methods for pro-
cessing information. Adult thinking ce.n then be conceptual-
ized as qualitatively similar to that of the young child but 
having a larger fund of lmowledge, more refined and better 
6 
practiced skills, and thus a greater ability to handle cogni-
tively complex problems. 
Problems in Cog:nitiye Developmental Diagnosis 
Some of the issues ad.dressed in the recent literature 
on transitive inference offer excellent examples of general 
problems in cognitive developmental diagnosis (Flavell, 1977; 
Smedslund, 1953; 1963). Flavell (1977) proposes that there 
are two sets of questions we may ask about any cognitive 
acquisition such as transitive inference. Conceptualiza-
tion questions ask about the cognitive processes which 
actually comprise acts labeled transitive inference. These 
kinds of questions are concerned with the kinds of stra-
tegies utilized by individuals as they solve any transitive 
inference type tasks. Practical assessment questions, on 
the other hand, ask what procedures should be used to test, 
on any cognitive process, for the presence or absence of 
transitive inference in a child. These questions focus on 
the methodology and analysis used in the design of a task 
of transitive inference. 
For the purposes of this dissertation we. will focus 
only on the second question, that of practical assessment. 
If we initially make the assumption that a child either does 
or does not possess the ability to make a successful tran-
sitive inference then two possible errors could result from 
an examination of his/her performance on a specific task. 
If the child actually does have the logical ability to 
make a transitive inference and yet shows no evidence of this 
ability on a task we will make a false-negative (Type II) 
7 
diagnostic error, whereas if the child does not possess 
transitive inference skills and yet somehow makes the 
correct "symptom" response we will then make a false- -
positive (Type I) diagnostic error (Flavell, 1977). Both 
Flavell (1977) and Smedslund (196J) offer a number of poten-
tial reasons for committing Type I and Type II errors. 
False negative errors could result from the following sources: 
1) the child might fail to understand the words in the initial 
instructions, 2) the child may not initially perceive that A 
is longer than Band Bis longer than C and 3) the child may 
not remember the two initial premises (A)B, B)C) by the time 
he/she is required to make the inference. The latter is pre-
cisely the area of inquiry pursued by Bryant and Trabasso 
(1971). In any of these three cases, the tester will misin-
terpret the absence of the symptom response as the absence of 
transitivity. The possible causes of false positive errors 
are: 1) the child might just guess, 2) the child might 
directly perceive that A was longer than C without using 
transitivity, or J) the child might use another (nontransi-
tive inference) solution strategy. One such strategy (Smed-
slund, 1963) is that the child might code the initial premises 
(A)B, B)C) as "A is long but Bis not long, and Bis long but 
C is not long." Since A has been coded as being "long" and 
C "not long" the child will choose A when asked to solve the 
AC inference relationship. In any of these cases, the tester 
will misinterpret the nresence of the symptom response as 
the presence of "true" transitivity. 
Much of the literature on transitive inference has 
focused on attempting to control for some of these causes 
of false-negative and false-positive errors. Let us now 
examine in more depth specific research on the variables 
affecting the acquisition and/or utilization of transiti-
vity. 
Methodological Variables 
8 
The major controversy in the literature on transitive 
inference stems from the apparently discrepant findings con-
cerning the age of emergence of transitivity. One group of 
researchers claims that very young children (age four and 
five years) are capable of making correct transitive infer-
ences (Braine, 1959; Brainerd, 1973; Bryant, 1973, 1974; 
Bryant & Kopytynska, 1976; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; DeBoysson-
Bardies & O'Regan, 1973; Harris & Bassett, 1975; Lutkus & 
Trabasso, 1974; Riley, 1975,1976; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; 
Roodin & Gruen, 1970; Trabasso, 1975; Trabasso, Riley, & 
Wilson, 1975) while another group of researchers supports 
the Piagetian claim that the age of emergence is around seven 
to eight years (McManis, 1969; Murray & Youniss, 1968; 
Smedslund, 1960, 1963; Youniss & Furth, 1973; Youniss & 
Murray, 1970). The major issues in the studies which examine 
the transitivity controversy can be most clearly reviewed 
with respect to four procedural choice-points: 1) choice of 
task, 2) response required, 3) initial training, and 4) method 
of feedback. 
-
9 
Choice of 'rask 
The tasks used in research designs for the in-
vestigation of transitivity generally diffe ·r in five major 
ways. (1) Some authors (Braine, 1959; Bryant & Trabasso, 
1971) have sought to control for false positive diagnostic 
errors by varying the ways in which the stimuli in stick-
length comparisons are presented to the subject. These stimu-
lus variations include adjustments in the length of the sticks 
used, the number of stimulus sticks presented, the distance 
between stimulus and/or test sticks, and the use of a Mueller-
Lyer illusion effect to help eliminate purely perceptual 
judgments. (2) Riley (1975, 1976) has extended some of 
Trabasso's innovations to comparative dimensions other than 
length, such as nhappiness" and "niceness." (J) Another 
group of researchers (Harris & Bassett, 1975; Youniss & 
Murray, 1970) . have increased the range of stimuli and test 
comparisons used to include relations such as "equal ton 
rather than the traditionally used"greater than" or "less 
than." (4) Most of the literature on transitive inference 
tasks is based upon nonverbal stimuli presentations but two 
studies (Harris & Bassett, 1975; Stetson, 1974) have tested 
for transitivity using an orally presented task. In these 
studies children were read the premise relations in sentence 
form and were asked to give a v-erbal response. ( 5) Lastly, 
task presentations have differed along the dimension of active 
discovery vs. passive presentatton of the i !J.itial premise 
conditions (Bryant & Kopytynska, 1976; Bryant & Trabasso, 
1971; Piaget et al, 1960). For the purposes of this 
-
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dissertation only the last and part of the first of the 
above differences will be addressed and reviewed. 
In one series of experiments (Bryant, 1973, 1974; 
Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; DeBoysson-Ba.rdies & O'Regan, 1973; 
Harris & Bassett, 1975; Lutkus & Trabasso, 1974; Riley & 
Trabasso, 1974; Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975) a new kind 
of experimental task presentation was utilized in order to 
prevent the transfer of absolute responses of verbal labels 
leading to a false-positive diagnosis on the basis of a 
nontransitive hypothesis. To control for the mere parroting 
of the verbal labels A="longer" and C="shorter" Bryant and 
Trabasso and their colleagues introduced more stimuli and 
thus more direct comparisons. The initial four direct 
comparisons involved five sticks of different lengths 
and colors (A)B, B)C, C>D, D)E). The rods were always 
presented in pairs and in such a way that they all appeared 
one inch from the top of a container. This was accomplished 
by boring holes of varying length in the box. This forced 
the child to use the color differences and not the abso-
lute lengths in making a choice. Each child was trained 
on the initial comparisons and tested a number of times on 
every one of ten possible pairs of colored sticks. The 
critical comparison was BD in which both rods had been lar-
ger and smaller in the initial comparisons. Bryant and 
Trabasso (1971) hypothesized that the probability of making 
a correct inference on the BD test is the probability of 
jointly recalling the information for each of the initial 
training pairs BC and CD. The data were consistent with 
-
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the original hypothesis. In summary, the five stick array 
box attempts to prevent children from making direct visual 
comparisons. This task thus has promise as a model for 
controlling the possibility of false-positive diagnostic 
errors due to perceptual discrimination and/or non-tran-
sitive hypotheses. 
This type of task presentation has been extended by 
Riley (1975, 1976) in a novel study which examined childrens' 
abilities to map four different comparative dimensions onto 
linearly ordered referents. Kindergarten and third grade 
children were shown a row of six faces on individual cards 
and were instructed that these faces represented a group 
of children differing in height, weight, happiness, and 
niceness. Order was indicated by describing the relations 
~tween adjacent faces (e.g. Mike is taller than Steve). 
Each child was tested after training on all possible com-
parative relationships. 
Riley's (1975, 1976) task was designed to test the 
hypothesis that individuals tend to integrate premise re-
lations such as A)B, B)C, C)D into a single linear ordering, 
ABCD. This task does examine the generalizability of the 
linear order representation to new situations other than 
length (happiness, sadness, etc.) with fully ordered premise 
information, but it does not examine the processing used 
when an individual is asked to make a transitive inference 
from separate premise relations. In a second experiment, 
Riley (1975, 1976) therefore designed a display where the 
premise relationships were always directly observable, but 
• 
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spatially separated. The child thus had to isolate and coor-
dinate the premise relations. Riley hypothesized that this 
display would force the child to respond deductively to in-
ferential questions. The comparative heavier was always 
used for the array of faces and the cards were displayed in 
three conditions. In the linear display the cards were 
ordered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. In the vertical display the five 
premise pairs were presented in a pairwise ascending or 
descending vertical order (e.g. (1,2), (2,3), (3,4), (4,5), 
(5,6)). In this way the resulting display formed two vertical 
columns running in ascending or descending order from card 
one to card five and card two to card six. In the random 
display the five premise pairs were presented in a random 
vertical arrangement (e.g. (5,6), (2,3), (1,2), (3,4), (4,5)). 
The random condition was designed to hypothetically prevent 
a child from utilizing an ordered spatial stimulus arrange-
ment to facilitate the construction of a cognitive spatial 
representation. After presentation of the premise relation-
ships all children were tested under both a Display Test, 
where the child was told to find the answer while looking 
at the arrangement of faces, and a Memory Test where no 
external display cues were provided. The hypothesis that the 
random condition would interfere with the use of a linear 
order problem solving strategy was partially supported by the 
decision time data in Riley's (1976) work. 
The second distinction to make in the task presentation 
category is that of "active" vs. npassive" inference problems. 
Bryant and Trabasso's traditional task (Bryant & Trabasso, 
lJ 
1971; Lutkus & Trabasso, 1974; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; 
Trabasso, 1975; Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975) is a 
passive one wherein the child is told A)B, B)C, etc. On 
the other hand, the Piagetian tower task is an active one 
which essentially differs from the passive task of the 
Trabasso group in three major ways. (1) Subjects must dis-
cover the initial premise relations for themselves in an 
active task. No attempt is made by the experimenter to 
directly ask the child to compare A with B or B with c. 
The child must figure out for him or herself how to acquire 
the needed premise information. Children who do not measure 
will not obtain this information. It is possible that this 
difference makes the task a more difficult one and thus 
hinders the expression of transitivity. (2) Subjects are 
allowed to concretely manipulate the materials in the task. 
They have the opportunity to interact with the initial premise 
stimuli. They are even required to actively construct one 
of the initial premise conditions (tower two or C). The 
effect of this difference is less clear. If it were not 
always paired with the above active discovery of premise 
differences, it may, in fact, make the task an easier one 
and thus facilitate the expression of transitivity. This 
would be in keeping with the Piagetian emphasis on act"ive 
involvement in the learning process especially in the pre-
operational and concrete operational stages. (3) The primary 
indicator of the presence of transitivity in Piaget's active 
tower measuring task is the child's active ability to use 
the available measuring sticks as mediators. In Piaget's 
-
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terms a mediator, in this problem,is a stimulus which can be 
conceptualized as both larger than one stimulus and, at the 
same time, smaller than a third stimulus. The mediator thus 
allows the subject to determine the relationship between the 
first and third stimuli. In other words, B must be conceptual-
ized as a mediator in any A)B, B)C, A)C problem. 
Bryant and Kopytynska (1976) argue that young children 
did not spontaneously use the measuring sticks in Piaget's 
active tower task because they did not realize that a direct 
comparison of the two towers by eye might be unreliable. 
These authors thus designed a measuring task where the two 
quantities to be compared were invisible (holes drilled in 
wooden boxes). One rod, marked off in different colors, 
was provided as the only measuring stick. In support of 
Piaget's findings, all children age five and six failed a 
version of the tower task and yet, many were successful on 
the hole measuring task. Bryant and Kopytynska concluded 
that there is some evidence that young children can spon-
taneously use intervening measures which implies the use of 
transitivity skills. It can be argued that the replication 
of the Piagetian findings and the new Bryant and Kopytynska 
findings offer further support for the idea that transitivity 
and/or measurement is not spontaneously used when the task 
construction allows for other possible solutions ("eyeballing 
it" or using self as measure). The Piagetian tower measuring 
task requires the child to actively construct the C (second 
tower) premise condition and does not restrict the chil~'s 
measurement stimulus (B) to only one cboice. Although the 
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Bryant and Kopytynska work does begin to examine the question 
of active spontaneous measurement it does not directly and 
actively test children's transitivity skills. A comparison 
of active vs. passive conditions is still necessary to explore 
the Piagetian conception of learning and development as a 
process of active discovery rather than of "passive" training. 
Bryant (1973) reports some unpublished data which appears to 
be the only direct attempt to address this question. He 
reports that he recently repeated Piaget's experiment with 
five year olds and found that "All children had previously 
done very well in a passive inference task. Yet they were 
plainly at a loss in our active test" (p. 423). Further 
examination of this question seems essential to the literature 
in this area. 
Response Required 
Investigators diverge again with respect to the 
type of response from which transitive inference ability, 
or the lack of it, is to be inferred. The major controver-
sy is between using the child's judgment by itself (Braine, 
1959; Bryant, 1973, 1974; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Lutkus & 
Trabasso, 1974; Murray & Youniss, 1968; Riley, 1975, 1976; 
Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Trabasso, 1975; Trabasso, Riley, & 
Wilson, 1975; Youniss & Murray, 1970) or using both the 
judgment and the child's explanation of his/her judgment 
(McManis, 1969; Smedslund, 1960, 1963). Investigators who 
require supplementary explanations thus apply a more strin-
gent criterion. 
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The most lively exchange in this area has been between 
Braine and Smedslund. Braine (1959) used a nonverbal tech-
nique where subjects were instructed to find a piece of candy 
always hidden under either the longer or shorter of two 
pieces of wood. Braine's task and conclusions that transi-
tivity and ordinality were acquired between ages five and six 
were severely criticized by Srnedslund (1963) for failure to 
control for Type I error due to solutions by irrelevant non-
transitive hypotheses. Smedslund presented replication data 
of his own in support of Piaget's norms and Braine (1964) 
replied that Smedslund's criticisms were far fetched since 
there was no evidence for the occurrence of non-transitive 
solutions in his work. Braine (1964) presented new data 
which failed to reveal non-transitive solutions and repli-
cated his original findings. Smedslund (1965) responded to 
Braine's reply and added the criticism of "pseudomeasurernent" 
to his previous charges to Braine. Pseudomeasurement refers 
to tasks where only one of two sticks to be compared is 
measured. Smedslund asserts that this type of condition does 
not control for the possibility of non-transitive reasoning 
of the type A)B therefore A>C or A(B therefore A(C. Smedslund 
hypothesized instead, that children may apply transitive and 
non-transitive strategies differentially on measuring trials. 
He argues that young children w~o succeed on genuine measure-
ment trials (trials where both sticks are measured) apply non-
transitive hypotheses in the pseudomeasurement trials both 
when the previously measured stick is correct and when it is 
incorrect, while children who fail in the genuine measurement 
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trials do not apply non-transitive hypotheses when the pre-
viously measured stick is incorrect. Smedslund (1965) re-
analyzed Braine's (1964) data and found that subjects who 
passed the genuine measurement items performed better on 
pseudomeasurement trials than did subjects who failed on the 
measurement items. 
Brainerd (1973) argues that the discrepancy between 
Braine 1s and Smedslund's data might be due, in part, to the 
different response criteria employed by each for determining 
the presence of transitivity. Braine's criteria were judg-
ments only while Smedslund's were judgments plus adequate 
explanations. Brainerd goes on to state " ••• the basic proof 
for the presence of a given cognitive structure must, by 
definition, be a proof that an act of understanding appro-
priate to that level of structuration has taken place. By 
implication, if we wish to avoid being unduly conservative, 
then we require the minimum necessary evidence that an act 
of understanding has occurred" (p. 177). Explanations pro-
vide information about the nature of the underlying structures, 
but they may confound the diagnosis of the presence of a 
structure when utilized as part of the criterion measure. 
For example, a child may be able to make the correct judgment 
on a transitive inference task but would be unable to verbal-
ize an adequate explanation for the choice. The requirement 
of a verbal explanation as a necessary condition for diagnosis 
of correct transitive reasoning would exclude children such 
as the one above and might thus result in a false-negative 
error. Much of the discrepancy between age related findings 
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in the transitivity literature can be accounted for by this 
major difference in response required. It seems possible 
that younger children may, in fact, have the transitivity 
principle and utilize it successfully but may still lack the 
verbal skills to be able to offer appropriate transitive in-
ference explanations for their response choices. Smedslund 
(1963), Flavell and Wohlwill (1969), and others would argue 
conservatively that verbal explanations are necessary com-
ponents indicative of the true presence of a cognitive 
structure. Unless this criterion is employed we have diffi-
culty knowing whether or not the subject utilized a non-
transitive solution. 
Beese and Schack (1974) also oppose Brainerd's (1973) 
conclusion that childrens' judgments provide a better criter-
ion than do explanations for inferences about the presence 
or absence of cognitive structures. They argue that ex-
planations are the best control for Type I error due to 
non-transitive hypotheses and that this source of error 
cannot be eliminated by stimulus refinements as Brainerd 
suggested. Brainerd (1974) strongly answers Reese and 
Schack (1974) by asserting that their criticism "also may 
be faulted on the ground that it is predicated on a source 
of error (irrelevant hypotheses) which is not even known 
to exist" (p. 71). This heated debate was finally settled 
by Brainerd (1977) in a recent publication. In this work 
Brainerd psychometrically analyzed the criterion question 
wit h respect to the sequential development of Piagetian 
concepts in children. Through a series of mathematical 
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proofs, Brainerd concluded that the appropriate response 
criterion is the one with the lowest error rate, regardless 
of whether the actual errors being committed are false posi-
tives or false negatives. Brainerd also concludes that the 
currently available literature shows that error rates for 
judgments only are lower than corresponding error rates for 
judgments plus explanations. 
Roodin and Gruen (1970) presented the only work which 
specifically investigated the judgment vs. judgment plus 
explanation response criteria for transitivity. Groups 
of kindergarten, first grade, and second grade children 
were given a task similar to that of Smedslund (1963) and 
employing Mueller-Lyer illusions to correct for the possibil-
ity of a perceptually dominated solution. One-half of the 
children at each grade level were allowed to use a memory aid 
for comparisons of A)B and B)C while the other half were not. 
Almost all subjects who could verbally explain their judgments 
also made correct judgments although the converse was not 
supported. Age differences were found to be significant for 
both criteria only in the no memory condition. In the memory 
aid condition age differences were only significant when a 
judgment plus explanation criterion was employed. Also there 
was ·found to be a significant difference in the number of 
transitive responses depending on the criterion. Subjects 
provided a significantly greater number of correct judgments 
than judgments plus explanations. Further examination of the 
effects of different response criteria needs to be conducted 
using other types of task presentations such as those used 
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by Trabasso and his colleagues. 
Training 
The primary hypothesis advanced by Bryant and 
Trabasso and their colleagues is that children's difficulty 
in making transitive inferences may be more a matter of 
memory limitations than of logical competence level (Bryant, 
1973, 1974; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Lutkus & Trabasso, 1974; 
Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Roodin & Gruen, 1970; Trabasso, 1975; 
Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson , 1975). Their standard paradigm 
for controlling the forgetting of the initial premises is 
the following: 1) the subject is trained on one initial 
pair comparison at a time in a choice discrimination task 
where comparative questions are asked; 2) when one pair is 
mastered {8 out of 10 successful choices) the next one is 
learned; 3) when the four pairs are trained to criterion the 
second training phase begins. All four pairs are now pre-
sented in a blocked, randomized order. This continues until 
the child responds correctly to six successive presentations 
of each pair; and 4) testing follows immediately after com-
pletion of the two training phases. 
In all studies where this procedure is used for en-
suring retention of the premises, the authors consistently 
find that children two or more years younger than Piaget's 
subjects successfully make transitive inferences, even on 
the critical BD task. This was _also found to be true for 
retarded subjects whose mental age was five to seven years 
( Lutkus & 'rrabasso, 1974) • Compared to intellectually 
average subjects of similar ~lA level, retardates took 
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longer to learn the initial comparisons in the training 
phase, but their performance on transitivity tests was 
above chance, with the majority of the subjects perfect, 
and their overall performance slightly below their intellec-
tually average control subjects. Bryant and Trabasso con-
sistently found that memory for initial comparisons is 
highly correlated with performance on transitivity tasks 
(Bryant, 1973, 1974; Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Lutkus & 
Trabasso, 1974; Riley & Trabasso, 1974, Trabasso, 1975). 
This is especially true when the critical premises for the 
BD comparison (B)C, C>D) are examined. Although Smedslund 
(1963) did try to control for this variable in his work by 
asking the subject to restate the premises immediately 
before the test question, Bryant and Trabasso continued to 
argue that the children did not have adequate training to 
be certain of retention of the initial training comparisons. 
Riley and Trabasso (1974) sought to control for two 
more possible sources of error in the training phase of the 
Bryant and Trabasso transitivity task. Although the size 
and position cues were controlled in the original work of 
Bryant and Trabasso {1971), the sticks were arranged in a 
display box so that location relative to the ends and distance 
between members of pairs were correlated with a spati.al array. 
Riley and Trabasso removed such cues by presenting the sticks 
next to each other for all pairs in both testing and training 
by asking either "Which is shorter, A or B?, etc." or "Which 
is longer A or B?, etc. 11 or both, in three dlfferent experi-
ments. \men both comparatives were used, subjects (age four 
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to five years) learned adjacent pairs faster and more often 
reached criterion than when only one comparative term was 
used in training. In testing, the children were more often 
successful when double comparative relations were used 
within pairs during training. 
Riley (1976) complemented this finding in a study of 
three types of comparative dimensions. She varied the 
comparative questions in both the training and testing 
phases by asking either the comparative (e.g. "Which girl 
is taller?P) or negative equative question (e.g. "Which girl 
is not as tall as the other?"). It was found that decision 
times to negative equative comparisons were slower than to 
comparatives but no difference in error rates to these two 
question types was observed. These findings support Piaget's 
(Piaget et al, 1960) claim that young children reduce the 
comparative to a label such as A is long, Bis not long. 
As one of the Riley and Trabasso subjects reported: "You 
have two sizes of sticks, long and short, and you keep 
changing which ones are which" ( 1974, p. 197) • 
Trabasso and his colleagues have continually trained 
their subjects on training pairs presented first in an or-
dered pair sequence followed by pairs presented in a random-
ized block design. It thus remains to be determined whether 
or not both types of orderings of training pairs are needed to 
ensure retention of the premise information for subjects of dif-
ferent age levels. Examination of the effects of each type of 
training pair order would also provide a measure of one of the 
methodological differences between Piaget's active tower task 
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and Trabasso's passive task - the child's ability to recog-
nize (B) as a mediator in any two pair comparison (A)B, 
B)C). A more detailed discussion of this distinction is 
presented at a later point in this chapter. 
Feedback 
Part of Bryant and Trabasso's (1971) initial study 
used visual feedback at the end of each trial during train-
ing phases. It was thus possible that a false-positive error 
could have resulted if the children solved the BD transitive 
question noninferentially by simply remembering that B was 
six inches and D four inches. The authors controlled for 
this possibility in their second experiment (Bryant & 
Trabasso, 1971) by eliminating visual feedback in the train-
ing session and using only verbal feedback instead. The full 
lengths of the rods were never displayed completely until 
the whole exper.iment was finished. Only one inch of each 
rod was displayed during training. Children learned the stick 
length comparisons by remembering the verbal feedback given 
by the experimenter; "Yes, the (red) stick is longer (shorter) 
than the(blue) stick" for a correct response or "No, the (red) 
stick is longer (shorter) than the (blue) stick" for an in-
correct response. It has generally been found that young 
children show ·a relatively poorer performance in those con-
ditions where feedback is verbal (Trabasso, 1975). Yet, 
their performance is still above chance level and qualita-
tively comparable to that of their older peers. 
Conclusions 
The practical assessment of cognitive abilities is not 
a simple matter. In the absence of complete controls for all 
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possible sources of Type I and Type II errors, diagnostic 
decision-making may be tentative and fallible. Smedslund 
aptly states "The relationship between any set of behavioral 
indices and a mental process, therefore, is an uncertain 
one, and a diagnosis will always have the status of a 
working hypothesis" (1969, p. 247). 
The practical assessment of transitivity is also not a 
simple matter. The controversy over the age of emergence of 
this cognitive skill is clouded with methodological difficul-
ties and variations. The researchers theoretical frame of 
reference seems to determine his/her choice of assessment 
techniques. A controlled examination of the effects of 
methodological differences in assessment variables such as 
training and response criteria would help provide some of 
the much needed clarification in this area of inquiry. 
The Present Study 
After a thorough review of the literature in this area 
one · could conclude that differing conclusions reached about 
the age of emergence of transitivity by previous investi-
gators are possibly due to differences in methodological 
variables; especially type of training and/or type of 
response criteria. Yet, no one study has specifically 
manipulated these dimensions simultaneously. It is the 
purpose of the present study to experimentally examine the 
effects of training and differing response criteria on the 
a~e of emergence. 
Once memory factors are controlled through adequata 
training on premise pairs, expansion of the training variable 
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can be a useful way in which to examine the active/passive 
distinctions essential to the differences between the 
Piagetian and Trabasso tasks. This study examines two of 
these differences, manipulation of materials and use of (B) 
as a mediator. Discovery of initial premise relations is 
~ot ad.dressed in this work. A unique active training condition 
addresses the question of whether or not interaction with 
stimulus materials will affect transitivity. 
Separation of Trabasso's ordered pairs and randomized 
block training phases into two distinct training conditions 
examines the subject's ability to recognize the middle term 
(B) as a mediator in any two pair comparison (A)B, B)C). 
In ordered pairs training, the middle term is used in each 
successive training comparison (Bin A)B, B>C) while in 
randomized block training each training pair is not necessar-
ily followed by the next training pair in the A)B)C)D)E 
sequence containing a similar member (B)C followed by D► E). 
Randomized block training thus requires the child to deter-
mine for him/herself the mediating stick in each two pair 
sequence. 
Trabasso and his colleagues have always employed a 
judgment only criterion in their work while the Piagetians 
have always employed a judgment plus explanation criterion 
in theirs. This study evaluates the effects of both a 
judgment and a judgment plus explanation criterion on a 
version of the five stick Trabasso transitivity task. 
Hypotheses 
The major hypothesis of this study was that differing 
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conclusions reached about the age of emergence of transiti-
vity by previous investigators are due to differences in 
types of training order of presentation of training pairs, 
and/or type of response criteria demanded. Specifically the 
following predictions were proposed: 
1. Transitivity will significantly increase with age for both 
the judgment and judgment plus explanation criterion. 
2. The judgment plus explanation response criterion will be 
more difficult for younger children than for older children. 
3. Children who receive the active training conditions will 
evidence significantly more transitivity than children 
who receive the passive training conditions. 
4. Children who receive randomized block training will 
evidence significantly less transitivity than children 
who receive ordered pairs training. 
5. The effect of the more difficult randomized block 
training will be more pronounced for younger children 
than for older children. 
6. The facilitative effect of the active training condition 
will be more pronounced for younger children than for 
older children. 
Subjects 
Chapter II 
METHOD 
Subjects were 120 Caucasian children including 60 boys 
and 60 girls. Subjects ra~ged in age from 4-5 to 8-0 with 
40 subjects at each of three age levels; 4-5 to 5-0 (median 
age 4-8), 6-0 to 6-7 (median age 6-2), and 7-6 to 8-0 
(median age 7-8). These age levels were selected so that 
they would span the controversial age of emergence phenomenon. 
The children who participated in this study were selected 
from three rural, middle-class communities in Rhode Island 
(Towns A, B, and C). The decision to select children from 
middle-class communities is methodologically consistent with 
the intent of the investigator to replicate the subject pop-
ulations used in the literature on transitivity as closely 
as possible. 
The children were selected according to their date of 
birth; and parental permission was required for participation 
in this study. Subjects were then randomly selected for par-
ticipation in the study from the entire group of subjects in 
each age level who returned parental permission forms. All 
children age 4-5 to 5-0 lived in Towns A and Band attended 
one of two privately operated nursery schools located within 
the communities. The children age 6-0 to 6-7 and 7- 6 to 
8-0 lived in Town C and attended first or second grade in 
one of three public elementary schools located in that commun-
ity. 
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An attempt was made to select children from communities 
with similar socioeconomic levels. Evaluation of the socio-
economic level of these communities was based upon the mean 
level of income of the residents in the community. The State 
Department of Rhode Island reports that the mean income in 
1970 (latest available census data) was $10,216 for Town A, 
$11,773 for Town B, and $11,957 for Town C. The State 
Department also reported the following projected median 
levels of income for 1976; Town A $14,600, Town B $15,400, 
and Town C $15,600. 
All subjects were randomly assigned by sex to one of 
the four training conditions used in this study. One-fourth 
of the subjects at each age level received Active Ordered 
Pairs Training, one-fourth received Active Randomized Block 
Training, one-fourth received Passive Ordered Pairs Training, 
and one-fourth received Passive Randomized Block Training. 
Equal numbers of boys and girls received each training con-
dition. One male age 4-8 and one female age 6-2 were re-
luctant to participate in the study and evidenced a lack of 
understanding of the general task instructions. These sub-
jects were thus eliminated from the study and were replaced 
by randomly selected same-sex children from the appropriate 
age level subject pool. 
Materials 
Five metal standard teaching pointers of adjustable 
length (from 5 inches (12.7 cm.) to 25 inches (63.5 cm.)) 
were used. The sticks were color coded in red, blue, green, 
yellow, and brown masking tape. The colored tape was 
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wrapped around the top two inches (5.2 cm.) of the pointers 
to a depth of one-eighth inch {.J cm.). A screened wooden 
rack was used in some training and in all testing conditions 
for presentation of sticks. The rack was constructed so 
that two sticks protruded 2 inches (5.1 cm.) from the top; 
the full lengths of the sticks were hidden from view by 
an opaque black felt screen covering the front of the rack. 
Two one-half inch (1.3 cm.) metal picture hooks were at-
tached flush to the top of the rack. Each hook ·was 
J inches (7.6 cm.) apart from the other. The sticks were 
hung by resting them in the hooks so that only the colored 
taped portion showed above the rack. 
The rack stood 14 inches (35.6 cm.) by 8 inches (20.J cm.) 
by 1½ inches (3.8 cm.). The black felt screen was also 
14 inches ( 35 .6 cm.) by 8 inches (20.J cm.). The rack was 
made from two pieces of wood 14 inches (35.6 cm.) by 1¼ inches 
(J.2 cm.) by 1¼ inches ( 3 ;2 cm. ) and one piece .; of wood 
8 inches ( 20 .3 cm.) by 1¼ inches ( 3. 2 cm.) by 1¼ inches 
(3.2 cm.). The rack was nailed to a wooden base 12 inches 
(J0.5 cm.) by 3½ inches (8.9 cm.) by 3/4 inches (1.9 cm.). 
The apparatus used in this study is pictured in Figure 1. 
Procedure 
Subjects were trained and tested individually ln one 
20 minute to 45 minute session. All subjects were initially 
pretested for lmowledge of color names and comprehension of 
comparative length terms "longer" and "shorter." Subjects 
were asked to name the color of each of five pieces of tape 
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FIGURE 1. Rack and Screen Apparatus and Adjustable Sticks 
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pasted to a blank white card. They were then shown four 
pieces of yellow chalk of different lengths. The subject 
was asked to select the longer piece in two pairs and the 
shorter piece from two other pairs. Subjects were then 
shown the rack and screen apparatus and it was explained 
how sticks of different lengths can appear the same when 
placed appropriately on the rack. The first pair of sticks 
in the subject's designated color order was always used 
for the demonstration of the apparatus. The instructions 
given to each subject were: 
Today we are going to play some games with sticks of 
different lengths and different colors. See how these 
sticks can be made longer and shorter. The experimenter 
and subject manipulate one of the five sticks. The 
subject is given the other four sticks and the exper-
imenter continues saying ' Now here are the other four 
sticks. I want you to make sure that these all work 
in the same way as the other one.' The subject then 
manipulates the other four sticks. The experimenter 
continues 'Now, if I put these sticks onto this rack 
you can only see the colored top of the sticks. The 
rest of the stick is hidden behind this piece of 
black cloth.' The experimenter demonstrates the rack 
and screen apparatus with the first color order pair. 
'You see - these two sticks look about the same length 
from the front but if I turn the rack around then you 
can see that one stick is longer than the other.' 
The experimenter turns rack around and lets the sub-
ject see the sticks of different lengths on the back 
side. 'Now I'm going to show you two sticks at a 
time and ask you to (Active conditions - 'make one 
longer than the other one') (Passive conditions -
'tell me which one is longer or which one is shorter'). 
The important thing is to try to remember which sticks 
are longer than other sticks and which sticks are shorter 
than other sticks. I'm going to give you lots of prac-
tice with the sticks and try very hard to remember which 
is longer and which stick is shorter in every two sticks 
I show you. After you practice for awhile then we'll 
try to see how much you remember. So be sure you try 
to remember which sticks are longer than others and 
which sticks are shorter than others e Now tell me 
what you are supposed to try to remember while you 
practice?' After the subject successfully repeated 
the task directions the training phase began. 
All subjects were then trained on the four basic premise 
pairs (AB, BC, CD, DE). 
Training 
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The passive training levels differed from the active 
training levels only in that the subjects were not requested 
to manipulate the lengths of the five color coded sticks them-
selves. The decision here was to define Active vs. Passive 
training conditions only in terms of the concrete manipulation 
of the lengths of the initial premise pairs. In this way 
active has been defined in its simplest form. The ordering 
of the five color sticks by length was predetermined and held 
constant by the experimenter in the passive training condi-
tions. The subjects did not actively establish this order 
for themselves. 
It was also decided to manipulate the training levels 
by comparing training on adjacent pairs of sticks presented 
in order (AB, BC, ·cD, DE) with training on pairs of adjacent 
sticks presented in a randomized design (e.g. BC, DE, AB, 
CD, or DE, BC, CD, AB, etc.). All pairs were always pre-
sented to the subject in blocks of four pairs. This type 
of manipulation of the training variable varied the pattern 
or order in which the subjects were required to learn the 
adjacent stick pairs. Randomized block training also re-
quired the subject to determine for him/herself the mediating 
stick in each two pair sequence while in ordered pair 
training the mediating stick was presented in both the a1ess 
than" and "greater thana positions in each successive two 
pair training comparison (e.g. Bin A)B followed by B)C). 
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Two different randomly selected color orders were used 
during both the active and passive task presentations 
{Green)Brown)Blue)Red)Yellow and Yellow>Brown► Green)Red>Blue). 
The subjects in each training condition were randomly assigned 
to one of the different color orders so that five boys and 
five girls at each age level received each color order pre-
sentation. 
Active Ordered Pairs Training - Adjacent stick 
pairs (AB, BC, CD, DE) were trained in ordered blocks of 
four starting with the longest pair {AB) for one-half of the 
subjects and the shortest pair {DE) for the other half. The 
order of start was counterbalanced over sex. 
The subject was first shown how a color coded stick 
could be adjusted to different lengths. The subject was 
then presented with two 5 inch (12.7 cm.) sticks (A and B or 
D and E) and was asked to "Make the {green) stick look a 
little longer than the (brown) stick." After the child cor-
rectly adjusted the sticks he/she was asked "Which stick is 
longer {shorter)." Following the child's response both 
sticks (A and B or D and E) were removed and the same pro-
cedure was repeated with the next pairs in the ordered 
sequence (BC or CD, followed by CD or BC, followed by DE or 
AB). All subjects were given four adjustments of each pair. 
It was impossible to have an incorrect trial in the Active 
conditions due to the nature of the task. The training 
criterion level for the Active conditions was determined by 
reviewing the Riley and Trabasso (1974) trial of last error 
J4 
data for ordered pair and randomized block training for their 
subjects age 4-1 to 5-0. 
The placement of the sticks in each training pair was 
random for left and right positions but equal in occurrence 
over trials. The comparatives used for the questions and 
verbal feedback ( "longer" or "shorter") were random but 
occurred equally often over trials and left-right rack 
positions. All feedback during the session was both visual 
and verbal. While the correctly adjusted stick pair was 
still visible to the subject the experimenter said "Yes, the 
(green) stick is always a little longer (shorter) than the 
(brown) stick. 11 
Active Randomized Block Training - The four com-
parisons of adjacent stick pairs (AB, BC, CD, DE) were trained 
in a randomized block order. These pairs were presented in 
blocks of four pairs with pairs randomized within each block. 
Each stick pair was presented in the same way as those pre-
sented in active ordered pairs training. Placement of sticks 
was randomized in the same way as in active ordered pairs 
training. The same comparative questions used in active 
ordered pairs training were used in this condition with 
questions occurring randomly but equally often over trials 
and left-right rack positions. All feedback was both visual 
and verbal and of the same form as that used in active 
ordered pairs training. All subjects were given four ad-
justments of each pair. 
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Passive Ordered Pairs Training - Four comparisons 
of adjacent stick pairs (AB, BC, CD, DE) were trained in 
ordered blocks of four starting with the longest pair (AB) 
for one-half of the subjects and the shortest pair (DE) for 
the other half. Order of start was counterbalanced over sex. 
The placement of the sticks in each training pair was random 
for the left and right rack positions but equal in occurrence 
over trials. 
The five sticks were first adjusted in length by the 
experimenter to form the correct color A)B}C)D)E sequence. 
These length adjustments were made behind the rack and were 
not visible to the subject . Upon presentation of a stick 
pair in the rack the subject was asked "Which stick is 
longer?" or "Which stick is shorter?" Questions were random 
but equal in occurrence over trials and over left-right rack 
positions. The subject's response was a judgment indicating 
the color of the correct stick choice. · After the subject 
made a color judgment the rack was turned around to provide 
visual feedback on each trial. Verbal feedback (with the 
rack turned around) during the session was of the form 
"Right, the (green) stick is longer (shorter) than the (brown) 
stick" for correct responses or "No, the (green)stick is 
longer (shorter) than the (brown) stick" for incorrect 
responses. All subjects were trained to a criterion of four 
consecutive correct judgments on each pair (four consecutive 
correct blocks) or twelve blocks, whichever came first. The 
training criterion level for the passive conditions was 
determined by reviewin g the Riley and Trabasso (1974) trial 
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of last error data for ordered pair and randomized block 
training for their subjects age 4-1 to 5-0. 
Passive Randomized Block Training - The four com-
parisons of adjacent stick pairs (AB, BC, CD, DE) were 
trained in a randomized block order. These pairs were pre-
sented in blocks of four pairs with pairs randomized within 
each block. The five sticks were first adjusted in length 
by the experimenter to form the correct color A)B)C)D)E 
sequence. Placement of sticks was randomized in the same 
way as in passive ordered pairs training. The same compara-
tive questions used in passive ordered pairs training were 
used in this condition with questions occurring randomly 
but equally often over trials and left-right rack positions. 
The subject's response was a judgment indicating the color 
of the correct stick choice. All feedback was- both visual 
and verbal and of the same form as that used in passive 
ordered pairs training. All subjects were trained to a 
criterion of four consecutive correct judgments on each 
pair (four consecutive correct blocks) or twelve blocks, 
whichever came first. 
Testing 
Testing followed immediately after the training con-
dition was completed. Testing was the same as the passive 
training condit~ons except that no feedback was given. Each 
subject was tested two times on each of 10 possible color 
pairs. These 10 pairs included the four direct comparisons 
used in training and six new, indirect comparisons (AC, AD, 
AE, BD, BE, CE). The two test questions on each pair inclu-
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ded one "longer" question and one "shorter" question. For 
each form of the questions the sticks were in either the 
left or right rack positions equally often. The 20 result-
ing test questions were randomized in two blocks of 10 
pairs with the constraint that the same pair could not be 
presented in two consecutive questions. The total number 
of errors on the 12 indirect comparison questions was used 
as the dependent variable in this study. 
Response Required - Two different responses were 
required during the testing phase; judgments only or judg-
ments plus explanations. One-half of the subjects at each 
age level were asked to make a judgment only and the other 
half were asked to make a judgment plus an explanation for 
that judgment on the 12 indirect comparisons (inference 
pairs). Equal numbers of boys and girls in each of the 
four training conditions and in each color order were given 
each of the two testing conditions. 
Judgment Only Response - Subjects were asked 
to state the color of the correct stick choice in response 
to the test question "Which stick is longer?" or "w'hich 
stick is shorter?" 
Judgment Plus Explanation Response - Subjects 
were first asked to state the color of the correct stick 
choice in response to the test question "Which stick is 
longer?" or "Which stick is shorter?" Following each judg-
ment response the subject was asked "How do you know that 
the (green) stick is longer (shorter) than the (brown) stick?" 
Further probing such as 11Can you tell me a little more? 11 or 
--
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"Do you remember anything from when you practiced before that 
would help you remember now?" was used when indicated by the 
subject's response to the explanation question. A complete 
correct explanation for inference pairs was one which ex-
plicitly mentioned at least one of the correct premises for 
that test pair (e.g. for A)D the subject may say A>B, B>c, 
or C)D). The criterion for a correct explanation was the 
same as those used by both Smedslund (1960) and Roodin and 
Gruen ( 1970) • 
Summary and Treatment of the Data 
To summarize, sex of subject was controlled and color 
order was counterbalanced over sex, age, and training condi-
tion. Type of comparative ("longer" or "shorter 11) used was 
counterbalanced over trials and left and right rack positions 
during both the training and testing phases. Order of start 
was counterbalanced over sex and color order in both the 
active and passive ordered pairs training conditions. Testing 
condition (judgment only or judgment plus explanation) was 
counterbalanced over sex, age, color order, and training con-
dition. 
The data collected by both the judgment only and judgment 
plus explanation measures established the basis fer two factor-
ial 3 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance. The factors in the design 
were age (4-5 to 5-0, 6-0 to 6-7, and 7-6 to 8-0), type of 
training (active and passive), and order of training pairs 
(randomized block and ordered pairs). The schematic represen-
tation of the experimental design is presented in Figure 2. 
The level of significance was established at p(.05. 
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EXPLANATION 
FIGURE 2. Schematic Representation of Treatment Conditions 
Chapter III 
RESULTS 
This chapter has been divided into five sections. The 
first section presents the preliminary analyses of inference 
pair errors on all variables which were controlled or counter-
balanced in the study. The second section presents the analy-
sis of inference pair errors for the judgment criterion. The 
third section presents the analysis of inference pair errors 
for the explanation criterion. The fourth section presents 
the analysis of the training pair error data during the test-
ing period. Finally, the fifth section presents a categori-
cal analysis of the explanation data from the judgment plus 
explanation testing condition. 
Preliminary Analyses 
In order to determine whether or not the judgment data 
from both the judgment only and judgment plus explanation 
criterion could be combined, an initial one-way analysis of 
variance was performed comparing the number of judgment er-
rors in the judgment only condition to the number of judg-
ment errors in the judgment plus explanation condition. An 
F max test (Winer, 1971) indicated no violation of the homo-
geneity of variance assumption [F max (2,59)= 1.014, ~).05]. 
There was no significant difference in the number of infer-
ence pair errors [P (1,118)= .044, Q).O~. Therefore, it 
could be concluded that the nu.i~ber of judgment errors made 
by a subject who is :not asked to give an explanation for his/ 
her judgment does not differ significantly from the number of 
judgment errors made by a subject ~ho is asked to give an 
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explanation. As a result of this analysis the judgment data 
from both g1•oups were combined and all further analyses on 
this criterion were performed for the entire sample (N = 120). 
In order to control .for possible confounding variables 
sex (male, female), order of start (pair AB or pair DE) for 
ordered pair conditions only, and color order (green>brown> 
blue>red)yellow and yellow 1brown)green)red)blue) were each 
analyzed by a one-way analysis of variance for both the judg-
ment and the expla~..ation criterion. As a preliminary proce-
dure, Hartley's F max test (Winer, 1971) was applied to the 
data and in,dicated no violation of the homogeneity of vari-
ance assumption for any of these variables: sex [F max 
(2,59) = 1.163, 12.).05], order of start [F max (2,29) = 
1.002, 12.>.05], and color order [F max (2,59) = 
No significant sex difference was found for either the 
judgment [F (1,118) = .078, ;g).oiJ or the explm1ation cri-
terion [F (1,58) = .597, 12).05]. The analyses of variance 
for order of start in ordered pair conditions yielded no 
significant differences for either the judgment[F (1,58) = 
.001, 12.).05] or the explanation criterion[F (1,28) = .378, 
12.).05]. 
A significant difference was found for color order for 
the judgment criterion [F (1,118) = 7.068, 12.(.05Jout no sig-
nificant difference was found for the explanation criterion 
[F (1,58) = 1.743, R).05]. The mean inference pair error 
score for judgments for the green)brown)blue)red)yellow color 
order was 3.317 (SD= 2.J18) and the mean error score for the 
yellow)brown)green)red)blue color order was 4.550 (SD= 2.746). 
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Since both color orders were rando~ly selected from all 
possible color order combinations no viable explanation can 
be offered for this significant effect. Furthermore, no 
explanation can be offered for the significance of this 
effect for .QlllI. the judgment criterion and not for the ex-
planation criterion. It was thus decided to treat this re-
sult as an artifact and proceed with the rest of the analyses 
without introducing color order as an independent variable. 
Judgment Scores 
The means and standard deviations for all judgment data 
are reported in Table 7 in Appendix B. The data collected 
for the judgment criterion were analyzed by a 3X2X2 analy-
sis of variance. The analysis contained the following fac-
tors: age of subjects (4-5 to 5-0, 6-0 to 6-7, 7-6 to 8-0), 
type of training (passive and active), and order of training 
pairs (random block and ordered pair). Hartley's F max test 
0 (Winer, 1971) was applied to the data and no violation of 
the homogeneity of variance assumption was found [F max (12,9)= 
6.302, n).05]. The summary of the analysis of variance of the 
judgment error scores on inference pairs is presented in 
Table 1. 
As can be seen in Table 1, significant differences were 
found for age [F (2,108) = 14.885, .:Q.(.05] , type of training 
[F (1,108) = 18.168, n(.05], and the interaction of age by 
type of training [F (2,108) = 3.793, ~(..05]~ The summary 
of the means comprising this interaction are presented in 
Table 2. This interaction is depicted in Figure J. 
Table 1 
Summary Table of a JX2X2 Analysis of Variance 
for Judgments by Age, Order of 'rraining Pairs, 
and Type of Training 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source Squares Freedom Square 
Age (A) 142.067 2 71. OJJ 
Order of Training 
Pairs ( B) 2.700 1 2.700 
Type of Training 
(C) 86.700 1 86.700 
AXE 11.400 2 5.700 
AXC 36.200 2 18.100 
BXC 8 • .5.3.3 1 8.5.33 
AXBXC 4.467 2 2.233 
Error 51.5.390 108 4.772 
*;Q. ( .05 
Table 2 
Summary of Judgment Mean Error Scores 
and Standard Deviations on Inference Pairs for 
Age of Subjects With Type of Training 
T;i:ge of T~aining 
4J 
F 
14.885* 
.566 
18.168* 
1.194 
J.793* 
1.788 
.468 
Age of Subjects Passive Active 
4-5 to .5-0 M=5.J5 SD=2.04 tl=.5 •.55 SD=2.41 
6-0 to 6-7 M=2.J5 SD=2.50 M=4.45 SD=2.02 
... 6 ( - to 8-0 "'- 1 55 !:!,--.... cn- 1 /11 ~---.. ,. M=4.J5 sn·-2 JQ ~ - . '-' 
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Figure J. Interaction of Age and Type of Training for 
Judgment Errors on Inference Pairs. 
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Due to the significance of the age by type of training 
interaction it was necessary to analyze both the age effects 
within the two levels of type of training and the type of 
training effects within the three age levels. Simple-effects 
tests (Winer, 1971) showed significant age differences for 
passive training only [F (2,108) = 93.4, R(.05]. Error 
scores on active training were not found to be significantly 
different across age levels [F (2,108) = 1.858, ~).05]. A 
Newman-Keuls test (Winer, 1971) indicated a significant dif-
ference between the youngest subjects and subjects in each 
of the other two age groups for passive training on the judg-
ment criterion (~(.05). The middle age subjects and the 
oldest subjects did not differ significantly from each other. 
It was thus found that passive training was significantly 
more difficult for the youngest subjects (age 4-5 to 5-0) 
than for subjects in either of the other age groups. 
Simple effects also indicated that active training was 
significantly more difficult than passive training for both 
the middle age group [F (1,108) = 9.24, R(.05] and the oldest 
age group [F (1,108) = 16.43, R{.05] but neither type of 
training was found to be significantly more difficult for the 
youngest age group [F (1,108) = .40, R).05]. 
Explanatign Scores 
The means and standard deviations for all explanation 
data are reported in Table 8 in Appendix B. The data col-
lected for the explanation criterion were analyzed by a 
2X2X2 analysis of variance. The analysis contained the fol-
lowing factors: age of subjects (6-0 to 6-7 and 7-6 to 8-0), 
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type of training (passive and active), and order of training 
pairs (random block and ordered pair). The 4-5 to 5-0 age 
group was excluded from this analysis due to the lack of 
variability in their explanation scores. The mean number 
of errors on inference pairs for this group was 11.950 (SD= 
.224). Only one subject in all conditions gave one correct 
explanation out of a total of 240 possible correct explana-
tions. The means for the subjects age 6-0 to 6-7 and 7-6 to 
8-0 were 6.950 (SD= 4.249) and 4.900 (SD= 3.523) respec-
tively. The means for the three age groups are depicted in 
Figure 4. 
Hartley's F max test (Winer, 1971) was performed and no 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
found [F max (8,4) = 7.426, n).05]. The summary of the 
analysis of variance of the explanation error scores on in-
ference pairs is presented in Table J. 
As can be seen in Table 3, a significant difference was 
found for type of training [F (1,32) = 6.744, n<.05 J. No 
other significant differences were found. The mean error 
score on inference pairs for passive training was 4.J50 (SD= 
J.553) and for the active training mean was 7.500 (SD= J.898). 
It can be concluded that active training was significantly 
more difficult than passive training for the explanation cri-
teriono 
Errors on Train.lpg Pairs 
The means and standard deviations for all training pair 
data during testing are reported in Table 9 in Appendix B. 
The data collected on training pair errors during testing were 
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Table 3 
Summary Table of a 2X2X2 Analysis of Variance 
For Explanations by Age, Order of Training Pairs, 
and Type of Training 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source Squares Freedom Square 
Age (A) 42.025 1 42.025 
Order of Training 
Pairs (B) 1.225 1 1.225 
~ype of 
(C) 
Training 
99.225 1 99.225 
AXB 1.225 1 1.225 
AXC 1.225 1 1.225 
BXC 2.025 1 2.025 
AXBXC J.025 1 3.025 
Error 470.797 32 14. 712 
*12.(. 05 
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_,E_ 
2.856 
.083 
6.?44* 
.083 
.083 
.138 
.206 
analyzed by a JX2X2 analysis of variance for the judgment cri-
terion only. It should be noted that no explanations were re-
quested for training pairs during the testing phase. The anal-
ysis contained the same factors as used in the previous analy-
sis on judgments: age (4-5 to 5-0, 6-0 to 6-7, 7-6 to 8-0), 
type of training (passive and active), and order of training 
pairs (rc1...ndom block and ordered pairs). Hartley I s F max test 
(Winer, 1971) was used as a preliminary procedure and no vio-
lation of the homogeneity of variance assumption was found 
[F max (12,9) = 5.022, n).05]. The summary of the analysis 
of variance of the training pair errors during testing is 
presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Summary ·rable of a JX2X2 Analysis of Variance for 
Judgment Errors on Training Pairs During Testing 
by Age, Order of Training Pairs, 
and Type of Training 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Source Squares Freedom Square 
Age (A) 47.617 2 2J.808 
Order of Training 
Pairs (B) 4.408 1 4.408 
Type of Training 
(C) 16.875 1 16.875 
AXB J.017 2 1.508 
AXC 22.050 2 11.025 
AXBXC • .51 7 2 .258 
Error 169.699 108 1.571 
*12(.05 
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F 
15.1.52* 
2.806 
10.740* 
.960 
7. 017* 
.164 
As can be seen in Table 4, significant differences were 
found for age [F (2,108) = 15.152, 12<.05], type of training 
[F (1,108) = 10. 740, 12 <. 05 J , and the interaction of age by 
type of training [F (2,108) = 7.017, p<.o,J. The summary of 
the means comprising this interaction are presented in Table 
5. This interaction is depicted in Figure 5. 
Due to the significance of the age by type of training 
interaction it was necessary to analyze both the age effects 
within the two levels of type of training and the type of 
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Judgment Errors On Training Pairs During Testing. 
Table 5 
Summary of Mean Error Scores and 
Standard Deviations on Training Pair Judgments 
for Age of Subjects With Type of Training 
Type of Training 
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Age of Subjects · Passive Active 
4-5 to .5-0 M=4.05 SD=l.35 M=J.60 SD=l.42 
6-0 to 6-7 M=l.85 SD=l.24 M=J.35 SIJ.=1.19 
7-6 to 8-0 M=l.80 SD-1.11 M=J.00 SD=l.11 
training effects within the three age levels. Simple effects 
tests (Winer, 1971) showed significant age differences for 
passive training only [F (2,108) = 21.03, Il(.05]. Error 
scores on active training were not significantly different 
across age levels [F (2,108) = 1.16, Il).05]. A Newman-Keuls 
test (Winer, 1971) indicated a significant difference for 
passive training between the youngest subjects and subjects 
in each of the other two age groups on training pair errors 
during testing (Il(.05). The middle age subjects and oldest 
subjects did not differ from each other. It was thus found 
that passive training was more difficult for the younger chil-
dren than for the children in either of the other two age 
groups. 
Simple-effects tests also indicated that active training 
was found to be significantly more difficult than passive 
training for both the middle age group [F (1,108) = 13.06, 
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11<. 05] and the oldest age group [ F (1,108) = 9 .17, .Q (. 05] 
but neither type of training was found to be significantly 
more difficult for the youngest age group [F {1,108) = 1.27, 
:g_).05] • 
In order to determine the relationship between memory of 
training pairs and transitive inference skills correlational 
analyses were computed between errors on training pairs dur-
ing testing and both judgment and explanation errors on in-
ference pairs during testing. Both the judgment and explana-
tion measures on inference pairs were found to be signifi-
cantly related to training pair errors. The correlations 
were r = .54 (:g_(.001) and r = .49 (11<.001) respectively. 
Partial correlations for the same comparisons were also com-
puted controlling for age and the same relationships were 
still found to be significant. The partial correlation be-
tween errors on training pairs and judgments on inference 
pairs was r = .45 (~(.001) and the partial correlation was 
r = .38 (:g_(.01) between errors on training pairs and expla-
nation errors on inference pairs. It can therefore be con-
cluded that there is a significant relationship between a 
subject's memory of the premise or training pairs and his/her 
ability to make judgments or explanations on transitivity 
questions. 
Categorization Qf Explanations 
The explanations given by all subjects were analyzed 
qualitatively. Six types of explanations were distinguished 
by the experimenter after reviewing the data from this study 
and previous Piagetian literature on conservation (Elkind, 
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1961). These six types of expla.ii..ations were: 
Category 1 - Don't Know and Miscellaneous Answers 
Category 2 - Romantic Explanations 
Category 3 - Perceptually Based Explanations 
Category 4 - Use of Irrelevant Relationships QDh 
Category 5 - Use of Correct Relationships Qnh 
Category 6 - Use of Correct Relationships and/or 
Irrelevant Relationships 
A more detailed definition of each category is presented in 
Appendix c. 
The twelve explanations for all subjects were random-
ized and categorized by the experimenter and two other in-
dependent raters. Each explanation was categorized in one 
category only. The percentage of agreement among the three 
raters was 98.47%. There was agreement between at least two 
out of three raters on all ratings. The percentage of sub-
jects at each age level giving explanations in each of the 
six categories was computed. A summary of these percentages 
is presented · in Table 6. It can be seen in Table 6 that the 
percentage of subje~ts giving responses in Categories 2 and 
3 decrease with age while the percentage of subjects giving 
respon.ses in Categories 4, 5, and 6 increase with age. The 
percentage of subjects giving responses in Cate gory 1 is 
almost equal for ages 4-5 to 5-0 and 6-0 to 6-7 and somewhat 
less for age 7-·6 to 8-0. These findings suggest that younger 
subjects {age 4-5 to 5-0) tend to give transitive inference 
expla:nations which are based upon romantic reasons or reasons 
which indicate an attempt to utilize direct perceptual cues. 
Table 6 
Summary of Percentage of Subjects 
Giving Explanations in Each Category 
Age of Subjects 
Category 4-.5 to 5-0 6-0 to 6-7 
1 27.92% 34 • .58% 
2 28.75% 5.00% 
3 37.92% 6.67% 
4 5.00% 11.67% 
5 .40% 20.83% 
6 0% 21.25% 
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7-6 to 8-0 
14.17% 
2 • .50% 
4.17% 
17.50% 
41.67% 
19.58% 
Children in the middle (age 6-0 to 6-7) and older groups 
(age 7-6 to 8-0) tend to give explanations which seem to 
indicate an attempt to utilize a linear ordering strategy 
where A>B)C)D>E and inferences can be made by simply re-
membering the order of the five stick sequence. 
Examination of the frequency distributions of error 
scores on each criterion reveals that the normality assump-
tion underlying the analysis of variance is not met for all 
three age levels. It can also be seen that the departures 
from normality are not the same for all age groups. The 
effects of departures from the normality assumption on the 
probability of' a Type I error have been thoroughly discussed 
by Pearson (1931), Lindquist (19.53), Box and Anderson (195.5), 
and Boneau (1960). The conslusions from all of these articles 
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are that the 1' distribution is generally insensitive to the 
form of the distribution criterion measure and therefore the 
departure -from normality will probably have no appreciable 
effect on the validity of the F test. The normality assump-
tion can be violated and the probability of a Type I error 
remains almost exactly at the level selected by the experi-
menter. 
However if one were to be conservative then three alter-
native procedures are available; non-parametric analyses, 
statistical transformations of the raw data, or use of an 
approximate test where the obtained E value is tested against 
a more conservative criterion where E = MS treatment/ MS error 
is assumed to be distributed as an f distribution with 1 and 
n-1 degrees of freedom (Winer, 1971). The choice of non-
parametric analyses is not feasible because there is no 
non-parametric equivalent available for the multivariate 
analyses needed in this study. The use of transformations 
is also not feasible since no one transformation would nor-
malize all of the frequency distributions found for the 
error data on both criteria. Transformations are also consi-
dered to be inappropriate for data where there is homogeneity 
of variance but non-normality (Lindquist, 1953). The most 
reasonable alternative procedure is to use an approximate 
test with a more conservative criterion value for Fat ~~05. 
When an approximate test is applied to the data in this study 
all F values previously found to be significant remain sig-
nificant except for the following: the age by type of 
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training interaction for beth the judgment criterion and the 
errors on training pairs and the type of training effect for 
the explanation criterion. As a result of this conservative 
test of significance these three findings may be considered 
tenuous. A more thorough discussion of the tentativeness of 
the type of training effects is presented in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV 
DISCUSSION 
The major objectives of the present investigation were to 
determine whether or not differences in the age of emergence 
of transitivity are due to the following methodological vari-
ables: (a) type of training, (b) order of presentation of 
training pairs. and/or (c) type of response criteria demanded. 
The first hypothesis was concerned with the degree of 
transitivity evidenced at different age levels when different 
response criteria are employed. It was specifically predicted 
that transitivity would increase with age for both the judg-
ment and the explanation criterion. This hypothesis was par-
tially supported. Subjects in the youngest age group (4-5 
to 5-0) demonstrated significantly less transitivity than sub-
jects in the other two age groups (6-0 to 6-7 and 7-6 to 8-0). 
Yet, the subjects in the latter two age groups did not differ 
significantly from each other on either criterion. 
The second hypothesis was concerned with the effect of 
the more stringent judgment plus explanation criterion on the 
age of emergence. Specifically it was predicted that the 
judgment plus explanation criterion would be more dif'ficult 
for younger children than for older children. The results 
supported this hypothesis. Only one child in the youngest 
age group gave a correct explanation. Children in both of 
the other age . groups gave significantly more correct expla-
nations. 
The third hypcthesis was concerned with the effect of 
the type of training task utilized on transitivity. It was 
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predicted that children who received active training would 
show more transitivity tha~ children who received passive 
training. The direction of this hypothesis was not sup-
ported. Instead, the results suggest that passive training 
is superior to active training, at least as active and passive 
have been defined here. On both the judgment and explanation 
criteria children who received passive training evidenced 
more transitivity than children who received active training. 
The fourth hypothesis was concerned with the effects of 
the order of the training pairs on transitivity. It was 
specifically predicted that children who received randomized 
block training would show less transitivity than children 
who received ordered pairs training. This hypothesis was 
not supported by the results. No significant differences 
were found for order of training pairs for either the judg-
ment or explanation criterion. 
The fifth hypothesis was concerned with the interaction 
of the order of training pairs and the age of emergence of 
transitivity. It was predicted that randomized block training 
would be more difficult for younger than for older children. 
The results did not support this hypothesis. No significant 
differences were found for age and order of training pairs. 
The sixth hypothesis was concerned with the interaction 
of the type of training and the age of emergence of transi-
tivity. It was predicted that the facilitative effect of the 
active trainin g condition would be more pronounced for younger 
children than for older children. The results did not support 
this hypothesis. Instead, active training was found to ba 
-
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significantly more difficult than passive training for sub-
jects in the middle (6-0 to 6-7) and older (7-6 to 8-0) age 
groups on the judgment criterion only. No significant dif-
ference in type of training was found for the youngest sub-
jects (a ge 4-5 to 5-0) on either criterion. 
No specific hypotheses were originally made concerning 
the effect of type of training and/or order of training pairs 
on judgment errors on training pairs during testing. Yet, 
these results were also computed and supported the results 
found for the _judgment criterion. No significant difference 
was found for order of training pairs (random vs. ordered). 
Active training was found to be significantly more difficult 
than passive training and more specifically, active train-
ing was significantly more difficult than passive training 
for subjects in the middle (6-0 to 6-7) and older (7-6 to 
8-0) age groups. No difference in type of training was 
found for subjects in the youngest age groups. 
Overall Implications and Methodological Issues 
The evidence in support of the contention that type of 
response criteria demanded affects the age of emergence of 
transitivity is consistent with the findings of the few pre-
vious investigators who have addressed this question in their 
work (Brainerd, 1973;, 1977; Roodin & Gruen, 1970). In Tra-
basso's original work (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) children as 
young as four years old were able to make correct transitive 
inference judgments. The findings of this study support Tra-
basso•s conclusions for the judgment criterion only. Yet, 
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the youngest children were almost always unable to give a cor-
rect explanation for the same inference pairs. This finding 
supports the Piagetian position which places the age of emer-
genc~ of transitivity at a later point, approximately seven 
to eight years old. It appears then that the selection of 
a response criterion will have an important effect upon the 
age at which subjects will be found to demonstrate transitivi-
ty. It should also be noted that the analysis of the judgment 
data in both the judgment only and judgment plus explanation 
criterion yielded no significant differences. That is to 
say that asking a subject to give an explanation on an infer-
ence pair did not significantly influence the subject's abil- . 
ity to give judgments on subsequent inference pairs. Thus 
future investigations of the effects of response criteria on 
transitivity should not need to employ a judgment only condi-
tion for comparison of judgment and explanation data. 
A major question to be answered is why the explanation 
criterion is so difficult for the young child? One possi-
bility is that the young child (age 4 to 5 years) does not 
yet possess the verbal skills which would enable him/her to 
give a correct explanation on an inference task. This hy-
pothesis would seem plausible if, in fact, the young chil-
dren found it difficult to give any verbal explanation at 
all. The categorization data for the explanation criterion 
partially support this idea. Yet, although children in the 
youngest age group did not provide explanations which were 
considered correct under the crlterion used in this study 
(cate gories 5 and 6) they did provide a number cf other types 
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of explanations which Pia getia.ns would claim are representa-
tive of preoperational level thinking. The young children 
generally provided explanations which could be labeled ro-
mantic (reasons based upon wish fulfillment or other ex-
traneous criteria) or perceptually based (reasons which 
showed attempts to utilize perceptual cues rather than an 
overall ordering strategy). In summary, it appears that 
young children age four to five years do provide verbal 
explanations for transitive inferences which are appropriate 
for their structural level. The young child's verbal reason-
ing is dominated by perceptual cues and he/she cannot yet 
express an understanding of the reversibility of ordered re-
lations. Thus, although reaction time and error data from 
the work of Trabasso and his colleagues (Trabasso, 1975; 
Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975) seem to indicate that the 1 
young child {age 4 to 5 years) uses a linear ordering 
strategy (where the child orders premise pairs in a sequence 
e.g. A)B>C)D)E) to make transitive inferences, the reasoning 
he/she uses to verbally explain the same inference judgments 
is still at a preoperational level. Trabasso and his colleagues 
have proposed that children studied do not use operational 
transitivity {coordination of the end terms via a middle term) 
to solve the problem. Instead, they believe that subjects 
integrate the initial information into an ordered, spatial 
array. This array is constructed during training, stored in 
memory, and internally scanned when inferential questions are 
posed. The subject thus makes an inference by "observing" 
the relation between the members of a pair in the spatial 
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memory array, and not by operational transitivity. In spite 
of Trabasso's hypothesis and findings the kinds of preoper-
ational level explanations given by the younger subjects in 
this study indicate little or no awareness of the possible 
ordering strategy involved. Although the Piagetian theorists 
have attempted to determine and validate the age of emergence 
for transitive reasoning, they have yet to study in detail 
the actual cognitive processes which comprise this skill. If 
young children reason in a qualitatively different manner than 
their older peers then what are the differences, and how can 
they be demonstrated and measured in transitive inference and 
other tasks? It would be particularly useful for Piagetians 
to accept the challenge of formulating a theoretical model of 
transitive inference that would account for the available 
data as well as does the linear order hypothesis, and would 
lead to new predictions. 
A question that must also be asked is why the transitive 
skills of the children age 6-0 to 6-7 did not differ signi-
ficantly from those of children age 7-6 to 8-0 on either the 
judgment or explanation criterion. This finding supports the 
research of Trabasso and his colleagues but Piagetians (who 
place the age of emergence at seven to eight years) would 
expect to find a difference between these age groups on the 
explanation criterion. It is possible that the criterion 
for a correct explanation (subject states at least one cor-
rect premise training pair) may have resulted in too low a 
ceiling for subjects in these age groups. The categoriza-
tion data seem to support this conclusiono As can be seen 
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in Table 6, subjects age 7-6 to 8-0 gave many more explana-
tions in which only correct training pairs were mentioned 
(category 5) than did the subjects age 6-0 to 6-7. It is 
possible that a more stringent explanation criterion than 
the one used in this study and that of previous researchers 
(Smedslund, 1963; Roodin & Gruen, 1970) would help to differ-
entiate the levels of transitivity for subjects in the middle 
and older age groups on the explanation criterion. Once again, 
it can be seen how the choice of a response criterion, in-
cluding the levels demanded within a type of response criterion, 
can influence the age of emergence of transitivity. 
The levels of judgment errors in all age groups were 
higher than those previously found by Trabasso and his col-
leagues (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; 
Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975). Three major variations may 
have contributed to these differences. First, the studies of 
Trabasso and his colleagues were usually conducted in a labora-
tory setting, over a period of two or three days (one session 
a day), and with monetary reinforcement in the form of a pay-
ment for participation in the project. The present study was 
conducted in a school setting, in one session, and without 
payment for participation. It is a reasonable possibility 
that this extreme change of training and testing conditions 
may have effected the demonstrated levels of transitivity. 
Second, and probably most important, the subjects in the 
present study usually received many less training trials than 
&id the subjects in the Trabasso work. The subjects in the 
present study received a minimum of four training blocks 
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(16 trials; four trials on each training pair) and a maximum 
of twelve training blocks (48 trials; twelve trials on each 
training pair). In other words, all subjects in this study 
were trained to a criterion of four consecutive correct trial 
blocks or twelve trial blocks, whichever came first. Subjects 
in Traba.sso•s work were usually trained to a criterion of six 
consecutive correct trial blocks. If the subject did not reach 
criterion in 100 trials {25 trial blocks) training was dis-
continued for that day and resumed the next day. If the sub-
ject did not reach criterion in 100 more training trials he/she 
was not tested. The time constraints imposed upon the present 
study by the public and private school settings in which the 
work was conducted made it impossible to train subjects to the 
levels used in the Trabssso work. It is more than likely that 
the lower criterion and training levels used in this study re-
sulted in higher overall error rates on transitive inference 
pairs. Thirdly, Trabasso and his colleagues have always 
trained their subjects using ordered pair training first follow-
ed immediately by randomized block training. In the present 
work, subjects received either randomized block training m: 
ordered pair training. It seems plausible that the double 
training method of Trabasso•s group provided greater and more 
varied exposure to training pairs and thus resulted in lower 
overall error rates during testing. 
These three hypotheses are further supported by the 
significant correlations and partial correlations between 
errors on training pairs during testing and errors on in-
ference pairs for both the judgment and the explanation 
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criterion. These correla ti ons and the hypotheses proposed 
above for the higher error rates found in this study support 
the Trabasso position that ability of children to make tran-
sitive inferences is dependent upon their memory of the ori-
ginal premise pair information. 
The type of training effect is opposite in direction to 
the original prediction that passive training would be more 
difficult than active training. In spite of its significance, 
methodological difficulties would seem to make this finding a 
tentative one. Due to the nature of the active task no sub-
ject could have had an incorrect training trial. In other 
words, all subjects always correctly followed the active task 
directions to "Make the (red) stick longer than the (blue) 
one" and all subjects always correctly identified the longer 
or shorter stick on evecy active training trial. Therefore, 
all subjects in the active condition received only four con-
secutive trial blocks (16 trials) of training. Subjects in 
the passive task were much more likely to have an incorrect 
trial and usually received between eight and twelve trial 
blocks (32 trials to 48 trials) of training. Given this 
difference in the number of training trials it is highly 
probable that the difficulty of the active task is due to the 
amount of training and exposure to premise pairs and is not 
necessarily due to type of training. At this point it seems 
that the effect of type of training (active vs. passive) 
still needs to be demonstrated. It can be argued that th~ 
de s igns of the active and passive training tasks themselves 
are reasonable measures of this dimension provided that the 
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number of training trials is held constant. The tasks them-
selves do seem to adequately vary the active/passive dimension 
but the differences in number of training trials did not 
allow a direct and controlled comparison to be made. 
The lack of significance for order of training pairs 
(random block, ordered pair) would seem to indicate that the 
manner in which training pairs are arranged has little effect 
upon a subject's ability to make transitive inferences. It 
was originally hypothesized that since random block training 
requires subjects to discover the order of the training pairs 
for themselves (as did the Piagetian tower task) it would 
thus be more difficult than ordered pairs training. Riley 
(1977) reports unpublished work in which she found signifi-
cant reaction time differences between random block and order-
ed pairs training for third grade subjects. Subjects who 
received random block training took three times longer to 
make a judgment during testing on inference pairs. Yet, no 
significant order of training pairs differences were found on 
the number of judgment errors on inference pairs during 
training. Riley hypothesizes that random block training may 
force subjects to organize the premise pairs in an ordered 
linear sequence while ordered pairs training may not. Since 
reaction time data was not collected in this study, the re-
sults of this work with younger subjects can only partially 
support Riley's (1977) findings. 
Given the setting in which this study was conducted and 
the time constraints imposed by the schools themselves, both 
visual and verbal feedback were used to facilitate training. 
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It is thus possible that subjects! judgments could have been 
based upon "nontransitiveN hypotheses (Smedslund, 1963). 
Subjects may have remembered the lengths of the sticks 
(especially in passive training where the lengths remained 
constant) and thus based their responses upon their memory 
of these absolute measurements. The categorization data on 
Table 6 for subjects in the judgment plus explanation con-
dition provides a source of analysis for this hypothesis. 
If this hypothesis were to be supported, one would expect a 
high percentage of subjects' explanations to fall into cate-
gory 3 (perceptually based explanations). Subjects who gave 
explanations in this category reported using absolute length 
or some other kind of measurement to make their jud~ments on 
inference pairs. It can be seen that category 3 explanations 
were given by 37.92% of the subjects age 4-5 to 5-0, but only 
6.67% by subjects age 6-0 to 6-7, and only 4.17% by subjects 
age 7-6 to 8-0. It seems plausible to assume that, in spite 
of the visual feedback, subjects in the middle and older age 
groups infrequently used "nontransitive" perceptually based 
hypotheses while subjects in the youngest age group often 
employed these strategies. Whether or not the younger sub-
jects' frequent use of perceptually based explanations is 
dependent upon visual feedback is, as yet, a difficult and 
unanswered question. Piagetians would continue to argue 
that the young child's dependency on perceptual cues is more 
a matter of structural level than the type of training 
feedback. 
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Future Directions 
The results of this study have initially demonstrated 
the importance of response criteria for future research on 
transitivity. Further examination of this dependent var-
iable is still needed for children of varying ages. Given 
the extreme .differences on both criteria between the sub-
jects age 4-5 to 5-0 and subjects age 6-0 to 6-7 it is 
suggested that future research include, subjects age 5-0 to 
6-0 (kinder garteners). Data from this group of subjects 
~hould provide a clearer and more complete picture of the 
development of transitivity. 
Studies on transitivity have usually employed age as 
an independent variable rather than as a dependent variable. 
Piagetian researchers often use age as a dependent variable 
in order to determine the age of emergence and developmental 
sequence for various cognitive skills (e.g. conservation, 
seriation). It is thus suggested that Trabasso's transi-
tivity task (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) or a variation of that 
task should be used in a study where age is considered a 
dependent variable. Data from this type of study using 
children of many age levels would also yield valuable infor-
mation on the natural course of development of the transi-
tive inference skill. 
The influence of methodologi~al variations in type of 
training or type of task is still undetermined. It is 
necessar y to meximize and hold constant the number of train-
ing trials while examining active and passive training. 
An extension of the active/passive distinction into the 
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testing phases of transitivity tasks would also allow a 
more complete investigation of this independent variable. 
Reaction time data during testing was not collected 
in this study. The unpublished findings of Riley (1977) 
would seem to indicate that differences which are not sig-
nificant using an inference pair error score criterion 
may be significant using reaction time data as a dependent 
variable. Future studies of transitivity should be careful 
to include analyses of reaction time data. 
It does seem clear that often held assumptions of the 
equivalence of methodology used in studies on transitivity 
are unwarrented. These assumptions appear to confound both 
the arguments over the age of emergence of this skill and 
the theoretical arguments over the cognitive processes in-
volved. Transitivity skills may best be investigated by 
recognizing that choice of methodology is often dependent 
upon one's position concerning the nature of cognitive 
development and that choice of methodology may also bias 
results in one direction or another. Methodological is-
sues and the effects of specific methodological variations 
should no longer be ignored in the examination of transitiv-
ity nor in the examination of all cognitive developmental 
skills. 
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RAW DATA 
Order 
Color of J only or Random/ 
Subject Sex* Order* start* J plus E* Age* Ordered* 
001 1 1 1 1 1 
002 2 1 l 1 l 
003 1 2 1 1 1 
004 1 1 1 1 1 
00.5 2 2 1 1 l 
006 2 1 2 1 1 
007 2 2 2 1 1 
008 1 1 2 1 l 
009 2 2 2 1 1 
010 1 2 2 1 1 
011 2 1 1 1 1 2 
012 1 l 1 1 1 2 
013 1 2 2 1 l 2 
014 2 2 2 1 1 2 
015 2 2 1 l 1 2 
016 2 1 2 2 1 2 
017 1 1 1 2 1 2 
018 1 1 2 2 1 2 
019 1 2 1 2 1 2 
020 2 2 2 2 l 2 
021 1 1 1 1 1 
022 2 1 1 1 1 
023 2 1 1 1 1 
024 1 2 
.. 1 1 .I. .I. 
025 2 2 1 1 1 
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Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
Order 
Color of J only or Random/ 
Subject Sex Order Start T plus E Age Ordered t) 
026 1 1 2 1 1 
027 2 1 2 1 1 
028 2 2 2 1 1 
029 1 2 2 1 1 
030 1 2 2 1 1 
031 2 1 2 1 1 2 
032 1 1 1 1 1 2 
033 2 2 2 1 1 2 
034 1 2 2 1 1 2 
035 1 2 1 1 1 2 
036 2 1 1 2 1 2 
037 2 1 1 2 1 2 
038 1 1 2 2 1 2 
039 1 2 2 2 1 2 
040 2 2 1 2 1 2 
041 2 1 1 2 1 
042 2 1 1 2 1 
043 1 1 1 2 1 
044 2 2 1 2 1 
045 1 2 1 2 1 
046 1 1 2 2 1 
047 2 1 2 2 1 
048 1 2 2 2 1 
049 1 2 2 2 1 
050 2 2 2 2 1 
78 
Raw Data ( Cont 1d.) 
Order 
Color of J only or Random/ 
Subject Sex Order Start J plus E Age Ordered 
051 2 1 1 1 2 2 
052 1 1 1 1 2 2 
053 1 1 2 1 2 2 
054 1 2 1 1 2 2 
055 2 2 2 1 2 2 
056 2 1 2 2 2 2 
057 1 1 2 2 2 2 
058 1 2 2 2 2 2 
059 2 2 1 2 2 2 
060 2 2 1 2 2 2 
061 1 1 1 2 1 
062 2 1 1 2 1 
063 2 2 1 2 1 
064 1 2 1 2 1 
065 1 2 1 2 1 
066 1 1 2 2 1 
067 2 1 2 2 1 
068 2 1 2 2 1 
069 2 2 2 2 1 
070 1 2 2 2 1 
071 2 1 2 1 2 2 
072 1 1 1 1 2 2 
073 2 2 2 1 2 2 
074 2 2 1 1 2 2 
075 1 2 2 1 2 2 
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Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
Order 
Color of J only or Random/ 
Subject Sex Order Start J plus E Age Ordered 
076 2 1 2 2 2 2 
077 1 1 1 2 2 2 
078 1 1 2 2 2 2 
079 1 2 1 2 2 2 
080 2 2 1 2 2 2 
081 1 1 1 3 1 
082 2 1 1 3 1 
08'.3 1 2 1 3 1 
084 2 2 1 3 l 
085 2 2 1 3 1 
086 1 1 2 3 1 
087 1 1 2 J 1 
088 2 1 2 3 1 
089 1 2 2 3 1 
090 2 2 2 3 1 
091 1 1 1 1 J 2 
092 2 1 1 l 3 2 
093 2 2 2 1 J 2 
094 1 2 1 1 J 2 
095 1 2 2 l 3 2 
096 2 1 2 2 J 2 
097 2 1 2 2 J 2 
098 1 1 1 2 '.3 2 
099 1 2 2 " 3 2 t:. 
100 2 2 1 2 '.3 2 
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Raw Data (Cont 1d.) 
Order 
Color of J only or Random/ 
Subject Sex Order, Start J plus E Age Ordered 
101 l l 1 3 2 
102 1 1 l 3 l 
103 2 1 1 3 1 
104 1 2 1 3 1 
105 2 2 l 3 1 
106 2 1 2 3 1 
107 1 1 2 3 1 
108 1 2 2 3 1 
109 2 2 2 3 l 
110 2 2 2 3 1 
111 2 1 2 1 3 2 
112 1 1 2 1 3 2 
113 2 1 1 1 3 2 
114 1 2 1 1 3 2 
115 2 2 1 1 J 2 
116 2 1 2 2 3 2 
117 1 1 1 2 3 2 
118 2 2 1 2 3 2 
119 1 2 2 2 3 2 
120 1 2 2 2 3 2 
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RAW DATA 
Passive/ 
Subject Active* J score* E score* TP score* 
001 1 .5 2 
002 l 3 4 
003 1 7 4 
004 l 4 .5 
005 1 7 4 
006 1 3 12 3 
007 1 .5 12 4 
008 1 4 12 2 
009 1 4 11 .5 
010 1 6 12 .5 
011 1 7 3 
012 1 4 3 
013 1 .5 6 
014 1 4 4 
01.5 1 11 4 
016 1 7 12 2 
017 1 4 12 6 
018 1 2 12 4 
019 1 7 12 4 
020 1 8 12 7 
021 2 3 l 
022 2 7 3 
023 2 6 4 
024 2 8 6 
025 2 3 5 
-
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Raw Data (Cont'd~) 
Passive/ 
Subject Active J score E score TP score 
026 2 2 12 3 
027 2 6 12 3 
028 2 7 12 3 
029 2 6 12 5 
030 2 9 12 5 
031 2 0 3 
032 2 .5 .5 
033 2 6 5 
034 2 8 3 
035 2 6 3 
036 2 6 12 3 
037 2 5 12 2 
038 2 3 12 1 
039 2 9 12 5 
040 2 6 12 4 
041 1 3 1 
042 1 0 2 
043 1 0 2 
044 1 5 1 
045 1 3 3 
046 1 0 9 0 
047 1 0 4 3 
048 1 1 4 3 
049 1 1 0 2 
050 1 7 7 3 
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Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
Passive/ 
Subject Active J score E score TP score 
051 1 1 1 
052 1 8 2 
053 1 2 4 
054 1 2 1 
055 1 0 0 
056 1 1 7 2 
057 1 4 12 2 
058 1 6 6 4 
059 1 2 2 0 
060 1 1 1 1 
061 2 2 3 
062 2 8 4 
063 2 7 4 
064 2 5 3 
065 2 4 3 
066 2 4 8 2 
067 2 6 6 4 
068 2 4 12 3 
069 2 4 4 4 
070 2 6 12 7 
071 2 5 3 
072 2 3 3 
073 2 6 3 
074 2 1 4 
075 2 6 4 
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Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
Passive/ 
Sub,ject Active J score E score TP. score 
076 2 6 12 3 
077 2 2 11 3 
078 2 4 10 4 
079 2 0 0 1 
080 2 6 12 2 
081 1 1 1 
082 1 2 3 
083 1 3 1 
084 1 0 1 
085 1 5 2 
086 1 2 6 3 
087 1 4 4 2 
088 1 0 5 2 
089 1 3 4 3 
090 1 1 1 1 
091 1 1 1 
092 1 3 2 
093 1 3 .5 
094 1 0 2 
095 1 0 2 
096 1 0 2 2 
097 1 0 0 1 
098 1 1 11 1 
099 1 1 1 0 
100 1 1 1 1 
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Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
Passive/ 
Sub.iect Active J score E score TP score 
101 2 3 3 
102 2 5 3 
103 2 3 4 
104 2 8 3 
105 2 4 4 
106 2 .5 5 4 
107 2 7 7 3 
108 2 7 11 4 
109 2 4 3 3 
110 2 3 3 5 
111 2 6 1 
112 2 0 2 
113 2 .5 2 
114 2 .5 4 
115 2 2 0 
116 2 0 7 3 
117 2 2 2 1 
118 2 9 12 5 
119 2 3 7 3 
120 2 6 6 3 
Raw Data (Cont'd.) 
*Sex 
1 = Female 
2 = :Male 
*Color Order 
1 = Green>Brown)Blue>Red)Yellow 
2 = Yellow>Bro\'m►Green>Red)Blue 
*Order of Start 
1 = Pair AB 
2 = Pair DE 
*J only or J plus E 
*Age 
1 = Judgment only 
2 = Judgment plus Explanation 
1 = 4-5 to .5-0 
2 = 6-o to 6-7 
J = 7-6 to 8-0 
*Random/Ordered 
1 = Random Pair Training 
2 = Ordered Pair Training 
*Passive/Active 
1 = Passive Training 
2 = Active Training 
*J score= Judgment Score(# of errors on inference pairs) 
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*E score= Explanation Score(# of errors on inference pairs) 
*TP score= Training Pair Score(# of errors on training 
pairs) 
APPENDIX B - TABLES 
Table 7 
Summar~ of Mean Error Scores and Standard Deviations 
on Judgments for Age, Order of Training Pairs, 
and Type of Training 
Order of Type of 
Age Training Pairs Training M SD 
Passive 4.80 1.48 
Random 
Active 5.70 2.31 
4-5 to 5-0 
Passive 5.90 2.60 
Ordered 
Active 5.40 2 • .50 
Passive 2.00 2.45 
Random 
Active .5.00 1.76 
6-0 to 6-7 
Passive 2.70 2.54 
Ordered 
Active 3.90 2.28 
Passive 2 .10 1.66 
Random 
Active 4.90 1.85 
7-6 to 8-0 
Passive 1.00 1.16 
Ordered 
Active J.80 2.90 
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Table 8 
Summary of Mean Error Scores and Standard Deviations 
on Explanations for Age, Order of Training Pairs, 
and Type of Training 
Order of Type of 
Age Training Pairs Training M SD 
Passive 11.80 .45 
Random Active 12.00 o.oo 
4-5 to 5-0 
Passive 12.00 o.oo 
Ordered 
Active 12.00 o.oo 
Passive 4.80 3.42 
Random 
Active 8.40 3 • .58 
6-0 to 6-7 
Passive 5.60 - 4.39 
Ordered 
Active 9.00 5 .10 
Passive 4.00 1.87 
Random 
Active _5.80 J.3.5 
7-6 to 8-0 
Passive J.00 4 • .53 
Ordered 
Active 6.80 3 • .56 
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Table 9 
Summary of Mean Training Pair Error Scores 
and Standard. Deviations During Testing for Age, 
Order of Training Pairs, and Type of Training 
Order of Type of 
Age Training Pairs Training M 
Passive J.80 
Random 
Active J.80 
4-5 to 5-0 
Passive 4.JO 
Ordered 
Active J.40 
Passive 2.00 
Rand.om 
Active 3.70 
6-0 to 6-7 
Passive 1.70 
Ordered 
Active 3.00 
Passive 1.90 
Random 
Active J.60 
7-6 to 8-0 
Passive 1.70 
Ordered 
Active 2.40 
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SD 
1.14 
1.48 
1.57 
1.35 
1.05 
1.34 
1.42 
.94 
.88 
.70 
1.34 
1.51 
APPENDIX C - EXPLANATION CATEGORIES 
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Exnlanation Categories 
Category 1 
Don't Know and Miscellaneous Answers - gave no reason or said 
"I don't know." Also includes subjects who merely restate 
their judgment responses for the test pair (e.g. Subject says 
"The blue is longer" for a blue/yellow inference pair where 
he/she has already responded "blue" to the test question 
"Which one is longer?"). Also includes any responses which 
do not fit the other categories (e.g. Subject merely lists 
individual colors of sticks without stating any relationship 
between the colors named. "The red one and the green one 
and the brown one helped me remember."). 
Category 2 
Romantic Explanations - made some attempt to justify choice by 
reference to criteria based upon his/her own needs and desires 
or upon some other external characteristic. 
a) Refers to reasons which are in no way related to the task 
at hand (e.g., "My Daddy told me so."). 
b) Also includes reasons of egocentrism and wish fulfillment 
(e.g., "I'm always right" or 11I just remembered it" or 
"I'm thinking" or "I just lmow it. I lmow everything."). 
Category 3 
Perceptually Based Explanations - a) Refers to having seen or 
played with the sticks in a certain way during training (e.g., 
"I saw it that way" or"I played with it that way."). b) Refers 
to verbal feedback by examiner during training "You told me 
it was that way." (Verbal feedback during training was always 
given at the same time as the visual feedback was being given). 
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c) Actually refers to sticks as they are hanging on the rack 
during testing. This includes references to the heights 
of the colored tops and/or the side on which the sticks 
are placed ~ • g. "The red is on that side " or "The red one 
is longer than the blueM (subject actually points to the 
tops of the sticks trying to show that one actually looks 
longer (shorter) than the otherLJ. 
d) Refers to measurements of sticks in an attempt to recall 
the actual stick lengths (e.g., "I measured them before 
and the red one was longer."). 
Category 4 
Use of Irrelevant Relationships Only - Gives at least one 
irrelevant inference pair and/or irrelevant training pair 
and/or incorrect color pair relationship as an answer to the 
test question. This subject's explanation does not contain 
a.mr correct training pair relationships relevant to the test 
question. 
a) Irrelevant Inference Pairs - uses other correct inference 
pair relationships to explain an inference test pair (For 
A)D, subject says A)C or B)D, etc.). 
b) Irrelevant Training Pairs - Uses other correct training 
pairs to explain inference test pair. These are not the 
correct training pairs needed to make the test inference 
in question (For A>D, sµbject says D>E). 
c) Incorrect Pairs - Uses a training or inference pair but 
states the "longer than" or "shorter than" relationship 
incorrectly (e.g. Subject says "Red is longer than blue" 
when actually blue is longer than red for his/her color 
order). 
d) Correct Pairs - Uses training pairs which are relevant 
to the inference test pair in question (For A)D, sub-
ject says ArB or B)C or C)D). 
Category 5 
Use of Correct Relationships Only - The subject only cites 
correct training pairs as explanations for inference test 
pair relationship. This subject cites no other irrelevant 
training pairs, irrelevant inference pairs, or incorrect 
pairs in his/her response. 
Category 6 
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Use of Correct Relationships and/or Irrelevant Relation-
ships - The subject cites at least one correct training pair 
to explain the inference test pair relationship but he/she 
also cites at least one irrelevant training pair. or at 
least one irrelevant inference nair, or at least one in-
correct pair in the same explanation for the same inference 
test pair. 
